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Executive summary 
VAT revenues in Ukraine are undermined by numerous privileges and low tax compliance due to ma­
nipulations and/or outright fraud causing inadequate tax   collection and high tax refunds claims. Be­
sides, there are both strong concerns about the vulnerability of the VAT system to corruption and com­
plaints from businesses about delays in refunding. 
Feasible options to overcome the low VAT revenue problem   include replacing VAT,   e.g., with a 
general sales tax (GST), or improving VAT administration. We argue that a VAT is superior to a GST 
in Ukraine. 
However, VAT administration can be significantly improved. Especially, we recommend 
•  	  to introduce VAT accounts tied to supporting measures such as the cash method and automatic 
refunding of VAT; 
•  	  to increase spending on tax administration combined with a reform of the tax administration body 
(STA), simplify legislation, and favor law enforcement. 
We argue that the problems of tax evasion and privileges are closely related. A reduction of   tax 
privileges   potentially   pushes   firms   towards   more fraud. Better administration (such as due to VAT ac­
counts) makes fraud schemes more expensive such that firms may be inclined to lobby   for   privileges. 
Therefore, we argue in favor of further and sustainable reductions of   VAT   privileges, in particular   sec­
tor-specific privileges, as a necessary complement to improved tax administration. In this respect, we 
recommend to re-draft and to enforce the Law on State Aid and to include an assessment of   all differ­
ent forms of direct and implicit subsidies, including tax expenditures, in the regular reports of the Anti-
Monopoly Committee to Verhovna Rada. 
Resulting higher tax compliance due to better administration and a growing tax base due to dimin­
ished privileges might then justify reducing the VAT rate. 
1 Originally published as Policy Paper T36, German Advisory Group / Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, 
Kyiv, June 2004. 
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1. The problem 
The value-added tax (VAT) is   a consumption tax 
collected at each stage of production and distri­
bution as a fixed proportion of value added and 
then partially reimbursed as the product is sold. It 
replaced the Soviet-style turnover tax early in the 
reform   process.   However,   the share of VAT reve­
nues   in the consolidated budget revenues went 
down from 29.3% in 1997 when the current VAT 
law was adopted to 16.8% in 2003. The share of 
VAT   revenue to GDP has almost halved from 
8.8% to 4.8% over the same period. This   signals 
a significant decline in actual versus potential 
VAT revenues (for a detailed analysis   of   recent 
Ukrainian VAT performance in an international 
context, see the Appendix). 
Although the 2004 tax reform   will bring impro­
vements such as a tax   base broadening, prohibit 
tax   arrears   write-offs, and address VAT refund 
arrears, the root of the poor VAT performance still 
lies in the past practice   of   granting numerous 
privileges and a low tax compliance due to mani­
pulations and/or outright fraud. 
1.1. VAT privileges 
VAT privileges in Ukraine come in two types, 
zero-ratings and exemptions. For zero-rated i­
tems, the VAT is not levied on the selling price. 
The seller receives full credit for the VAT paid on 
inputs used in production. When goods and ser­
vices are exempt, the VAT is not applied to 
respective sales. Unlike zero-rated goods and 
services, vendors of exempt products are not 
eligible to receive any credit for the taxes paid on 
inputs. The denial of input tax credits increases 
the production cost for the seller, although his 
value added escapes VAT. 
In general VAT privileges diminish the tax ba­
se and thus reduce revenues and increase the 
amount of refunds.
2  The Ministry of Finance 
estimates that total VAT privileges in 2003 a­
mounted to a revenue loss equal to UAH 38 bn. 
Most of this is due to the zero-rating of exports, 
while other “standard privileges” representing 
international practice commonly applied in most 
countries, cost some 3 bn of VAT revenues.
3 
2 However, if tax exemption occur at early production stages, 
sales by the subsequent businesses acquiring the goods are 
effectively over-taxed to the extent that inputs prior the e­
xempt stage are not creditable. As a result, the tax base may 
not be reduced but rather be augmented by a cascading 
effect. 
3 This refers to a number of goods or services because of 
political socio-economic considerations, technical difficulties, 
or administrative complexity, and includes financial interme­
diation, real estate, public administration and defense, edu-
However, the budget loss due to non-standard 
privileges specific to the Ukrainian VAT system is 
estimated by the Ministry of Finance to equal 
some UAH 8 bn in 2003.
4 Major privileges (with 
lower bound budget loss estimates in parenthe­
ses) include pharmaceutical products (UAH 
3066m); agriculture (UAH 936m); newly 
constructed housing (UAH 526m); periodicals, 
domestically produced books, and school books 
(UAH 363m); the car industry (UAH 340m); 
transport services (UAH 168m) and special eco­
nomic zones (UAH 86m). Verkhovna Rada can­
celled a number of VAT privileges when appro­
ving the 2004 budget. While agricultural sector 
privileges were partially prolonged until 2005, 
these privileges were terminated by the law “On 
the State budget 2004,” therefore the termination 
is in force for one year only. We recommend to 
cancel these privileges permanently. 
1.2. Low tax compliance due to outright fraud 
very   VAT   system is vulnerable to the following 
5  ethods of tax evasion:
  	  Non-registration for VAT. 
  	  Transaction is claimed not taxable, is   a gift 
rather   than a sale, or that there was an ab­
sence of consideration. 
  	  VAT   credit is claimed for non-creditable pur­
chases, such as a car used for non-business 
purposes. 
 Under 	 stated  sales. 
  	  Inflated claims for VAT paid on inputs. 
  	  Credit is   claimed for tax paid on inputs used 
in producing goods exempt from VAT. This is 
especially possible if a firm   sells   both exempt 
and non-exempt goods and services, since it 
is   not always   possible to link specific inputs to 
specific outputs. 
  	  Zero-rated exports are diverted to the do­
mestic   market. The producer obtains export 
papers, claims a refund, and then sells   the 
goods locally. 
  	  VAT is collected by a firm, which does   not 
remit it to the fiscal office, and then disap­












cation, health and social work, other community and social 
services, and exterritorial organizations. As standard VAT 
systems are destination based, exports are typically zero­
rated while imports are taxed. 
4  Draft law on the budget 2004 (in Ukrainian), Vol. 2, Kyiv, 
Ministry of Finance, 2003.
 
5 Agha, A. and J. Haughton, Designing VAT systems: some
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VAT replacement or better administration? 
The Ministry of Economy estimates the size of 
the shadow economy in Ukraine in 2003 at 42.3% 
of GDP.
6  As international evidence
7 shows a 
strong correlation between the size of the shadow 
economy and tax evasion, this already hints at 
the existence of a significant problem of tax eva­
sion in Ukraine. 
Tax evasion via one-day-survive firms is of 
special importance in transition economies. Ac­
cording to CEFIR (Centre for Economic and Fi­
nancial Research), Russian businesses indicate 
that the use of one-day-survive firms is the chea­
pest and most widely used VAT evasion scheme 
for large enterprises.
8 One-day-survive firms 
break the VAT collection chain. For simplicity, 
assume that neither firm A nor B have inventories 
or capital investments. Moreover, firm A does not 
pay for inputs, and A’s output is used by B as 
input. Under a normal VAT scheme, the tax is 
collected from value added of each firm. In case 
value added of firm A is X and value added of 
firm B is (Y-X), then VAT revenues will be equal 
to the tax rate (say 20%) multiplied by the sum of 
value added of both firms, i.e. 0.2Y. To avoid tax 
payments firm B creates a – typically small – firm 
F, that sells a service (which is difficult to value) 
to B at total price Z. Accordingly, value added of 
B is reduced by Z. Therefore, the budget reve­
nues collected from firm A and B will be 0.2(Y-Z). 
6  Message of   the President to Verkhovna Rada on external 
and domestic state of Ukraine in 2003. 
7  Tanzi,   V., Governance, corruption, and public finance: an 
overview, conference paper, 1999. Available at   www.adb.org 
8 Gorban, M., S. Guriev, I. Levina, Memorandum   on introduc-
tion of special VAT accounts (in Russian), Moscow,   CEFIR, 
July 2003. 
However, firm F disappears before the day its tax 
liability should be paid to the budget. In this case, 
the budget loss equals 0.2Z. 
Similarly, one-day-survive firms are used by 
exporters to artificially inflate VAT rebate claims. 
For example, an exporter may purchase a dum­
my service from a one-day-survive firm, pays to 
that firm and then claims VAT paid to that firm to 
be refunded from the budget while one-day­
survive firm disappears without paying to the 
budget. 
Thus, any government policy on VAT must 
necessarily involve an increase of the cost of 
tax evasion. 
2. A quantitative assessment and feasible 
solutions 
Table 1 reveals that in recent years the weight of 
VAT arrears in explaining the gap between actual 
and potential VAT revenues in Ukraine has redu­
ced significantly, while the share of VAT privile­
ges varied but remained high. The unexplained 
residual in the difference between potential and 
actual revenues seems far too significant to be 
due to changes in exports and investments and 
must therefore at least partially be attributed to 
VAT evasion. 
9  VAT   revenues   should also be adjusted for VAT refunds 
made for future VAT payments, VAT refunds made in expen­
se   of   excises, mutual cancellation of liabilities. According to 
the STA Order #209/72 “On the order of VAT reimbursement” 
reimbursement   is   made via: transfer of cash from the budget 
account   to   the account of the taxpayer; setting an amount of 
VAT   reimbursement against payments of value added tax; 
setting an amount of VAT reimbursement   against   other tax 
payments due to the Central budget of Ukraine. 
Table 1. Sources of the gap between potential versus actual VAT revenues in Ukraine (UAH bn) 
2000  %  2001  %  2002  %  2003  %  01-03  % 
(1) Potential VAT revenues  24.0  100  29.5  100  31.4  100  38.4  100  99.2  100 
(2) Actual VAT revenues*  9.4  39  10.3  35  13.5  43  12.6  33  36.4  37 
(3) Tax privileges**  n/a  n/a  7.7  26  12.3  39  11.0  29  31.1  31 
(4) Changes in VAT refund 
arrears  n/a  n/a  1.8  6  1.7  5  -1.1  -3  2.4  2 
(5) Changes in VAT arrears  -1.2  -5  6.5  22  2.8  9  0.3  1  9.6  10 
(6=1-2-3+4-5) Residual  n/a  n/a  6.7  23  4.4  14  13.3  35  24.4  25 
Sources:   National   accounts, Treasury reports, Ministry of Finance estimates of privileges attached to the draft budget laws, The reports 
on the budget execution prepared by the Accounting Chamber, Ministry of Finance Budget Overview, January – March 2004, p. 13. 
Note:   The potential   tax   base is   approximated as final consumption net of VAT. Potential VAT revenues are derived by multiply­
ing this proxy base with the statutory tax rate (20%). 
9  ­ * Net of cash refunds.  Moreover,   shifts   in   production,   investment,   and exports lead to changes in VAT refund claims in com
parison to gross revenues.
 
** Tax privileges are budget loss estimates of total privileges (except for zero-rated exports) by the Ministry of Finance.
  
 






















   
 













If we indeed take the residual in Table 1 to be 
a rough upper-bound proxy for tax evasion, both 
privileges and tax evasion have over the recent 
years contributed to the gap between actual and 
potential VAT revenues in Ukraine in the same 
order of magnitude, together representing up to 
8% of Ukrainian GDP per year. 
There appear to be two mutually exclusive po­
licy options available to deal with the low VAT 
efficiency in Ukraine. First, it is possible to repla­
ce the VAT with another tax that will hopefully be 
more effective. Second, one could improve VAT 
administration to enhance tax compliance and at 
the same time reduce tax privileges. 
3. VAT replacement 
The idea of replacing the VAT with another tax 
has recently been brought up. First, the Accoun­
ting Chamber
10 proposed to replace VAT with 
some other (perhaps sales) tax. Second, The 
President of Ukraine named VAT a fiscal threat, 
and in his yearly message to Parliament in 2004 
suggested the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
should consider possibilities of replacing VAT 
with some other tax.
11 
3.1. Which other tax? 
We argue that it is feasible to replace VAT only 
with another consumption tax rather than increa­
se the burden of the income or profit taxes or to 
increase import/export duties, which is in general 
not consistent with foreign trade liberalization. 
Although the considerations of the consumption 
taxes versus income taxes also include the 
regressivity of the consumption taxes in their 
minuses, the detrimental influence of income 
taxes on savings and investment are more distor­
tive. In addition, changes in enterprise profit and 
income taxes imply potential international trade 
distortions while consumption taxes are neutral to 
the place of production. 
Although there is no unique optimal tax sys­
tem, for each stage of development some prefer­
red tax structure can be identified. For transition 
countries, tax administration and compliance are 
very important, thus we should look for a tax to be 
easily enforced. Administration costs are usually 
higher for income taxes than for consumption 
taxes. Also, decreases in income tax rates yield 
10 The announcement of the Accounting Chamber dated 2 
March, 2004 is available at 
www.ac-rada.gov.ua/Ua/5/200403021.htm - 5k 
11 Available at 
www.ictv.ua/content/publications/economic/lghk_kdruhtrh.html 
comparatively higher de-shadowing effects, which 
is important given the large size of the shadow 
economy in Ukraine. 
Across the world, the role of consumption ta­
xes has recently increased in comparison with 
other taxes (with the exception of social security). 
For example, the share of indirect taxes rose 
from 32% to 38% in other CIS countries and from 
32% to 38% in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Baltics over the period 1990–2000.
12 
The most broadly known consumption taxes 
include the VAT, the general sales tax (GST), the 
turnover tax and excise taxes. We argue against 
the turnover tax because it stimulates inefficient 
vertical integration and has a tremendously nega­
tive impact on economic growth. The revenue 
potential of excise taxes is limited. In particular, 
because Ukraine has borders with countries that 
have lower excise tax rates, smuggling is likely to 
rise as excise tax rates are increased in Ukraine. 
The general sales tax, as applied in the U.S., is a 
tax collected at the retail level by vendors. It is set 
as a fixed percentage of the retail price of goods 
(and some services) and hence should not have 
the distortive effects of other VAT alternatives. 
We argue that the only feasible alternative to 
a VAT is a GST. 
3.2.  VAT versus GST in Ukraine: a compari­
son based on best practice criteria 
A. Tax adequacy. A tax should generate mea­
ningful revenues at socially acceptable rates 
while ensuring regular and stable budget funding. 
The tax base of both VAT and GST   is   in prin­
ciple equal to final consumption of   goods   and 
services. However, as by their   very   nature servi­
ces vanish with the transaction, most   services   are 
prohibitively   expensive to tax via a GST, and the 
GST   tax   base is normally reduced to goods con­
13 sumption.  Although there are services   that are 
also   difficult to tax with a VAT, e.g. financial ser­
vices, VAT still has a broader tax   base. Partially 
this   is due to the possibility to levy taxes on busi­
ness consumption. 
14 As international experience shows,  the GST 
rate commonly does not exceed 10% while VAT 
rates are usually set above 10%. Any   increase in 
the sales tax rate above 10% will most   probably 
result in less revenue and more cheating. 
                                                     
12 Mitra, S., Tax systems in transition.   World Bank   Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2947, January 2003.
 




14  Ebrill, L., M. Keen, J. Bodin, and V. Summers,   The Modern
 





   
 
 














   
                                                     
     
     
   
VAT replacement or better administration? 
Thus, replacing a VAT by a GST would most 
probably result in lower revenues. 
B. Distortive effects. A tax should also be eva­
luated for the extent to which it distorts   economic 
choices. 
15  GST   systems are prone to double taxation.
In addition, since a GST is almost never levied on 
services   but mostly on goods, the choice of a 
consumer   between goods and services is distor­
ted. This distortionary effect is smaller for a 
VAT. 
C. Tax administration and compliance. The full 
amount of   tax   revenues should be collected at 
minimum   cost   of tax compliance and administra­
tion. 
Since a GST is collected at the retail sales le­
vel, it lacks self-enforcement: producers and con­
sumers are not interested whether the vendor 
pays GST. The VAT is a tax   collected at each 
stage as   a fixed proportion of value added and 
then partially reimbursed as the product is   sold. 
Therefore VAT payers do care about the VAT 
paid at previous stages in order   to receive full 
credit according to invoices. I.e., even if the retail 
trade is   “in the shadow” only some (but not all) 
VAT revenue is hidden from   taxation while in the 
case   of a GST no revenue could be collected. 
Thus, in the case of large shadow economy and 
overall low tax compliance, retail vendors   could 
escape easily from the inspection by   STA (tax 
administration body), with the value added of all 
the production chain lost for the budget. On the 
other hand, the possibilities to falsify   refund 
claims and other widespread tax   evasion sche­
mes raise the revenue risk for the VAT. Therefo­
re, both taxes require effective audit and policing. 
A GST   requires less documentation thereby 
reducing total compliance costs as compared to a 
VAT. According to international experience, 
replacing a VAT with a GST decreases the num­
16 ber of taxpayers.  In addition, the introduction of 
a new GST in Ukraine would result in additional 
administrative costs of staff training, implementa­
tion of new systems, etc. 
                                                     
15  In   the U.S.   double taxation of intermediate goods and 
services is widespread: nearly 40% of GST revenue is col­
lected from business inputs, hence breaking the tax   neutrali­
ty. Ring R.J., Consumers’ share and producers’   share of   the 
General Sales   Tax.   National Tax Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
March 1999. 
16 Mikesell, J., Sales taxes, 1999. Available at 
http://www.spea.indiana.edu/pfa/Sales%20Taxes-top­
brief.doc. At the same time, with a VAT the tax administration 
possesses a natural instrument to   regulate the number of 
taxpayers   by setting a threshold for small enterprises above 
which registration is required. 
Therefore,   in the   absence of refund fraud, in 
erms of tax administration and compliance a 
AT   is more preferable for Ukraine than a 
ST. 
umming up, if an   effective tax administration 
s able to ensure the absence of breaks in the 
ax chain, a VAT is the more efficient con­








4. Improving VAT administration 
4.1. Which measures? 
To deal with VAT evasion, especially via unlawful 
VAT rebates, the President submitted a draft law 
proposal to Verkhovna Rada in early April 2004 
to introduce special VAT bank accounts. It is 
intended that these accounts be used exclusively 
for executing VAT transactions. In addition, the 
draft law envisages several supporting measures: 
1)  introduction of the cash method for recording 
tax obligations and tax credit, based on actu­
al receipt of funds from buyers for products 
sold;
17 
2)  automatic refund of VAT by the State Treasu­
18 ry;
3)  joint responsibility of all participants in the 
VAT operation chain  for VAT law violation on 
any stage (i.e., all firms are put at risk to lose 
their right to claim respective amounts of tax 
credits). A firm may be not allowed to include 
the amount of VAT paid on inputs into the 
VAT credit if the supplier of that inputs failed 
to pay VAT; 
4)  a reduction of the VAT rate from 20% to 17% 
in 2005 and then to 15% in 2006. 
Several deputies submitted two other draft 
laws on VAT administration. The first one (Depu­
ties V. Khomutinnik and S. Buriak) proposes to 
introduce special VAT bank accounts, the cash 
method, automatic refunds and a VAT rate re­
duction without joint responsibility. The second 
one (Deputies S. Teriokhin et al.) proposes to 
simplify tax cash refunding to firms with good 
reputation by introducing the concept of a “reli­
able taxpayer” with the consequence of denying 
cash VAT refunds to new firms. Verkhovna Ra­
da’s Finance and Banking Committee members 
decided to postpone the decision of suppor­
ting/rejecting the draft laws until further research 
17 The method currently in use is the first-event method, i.e. 
tax obligations and tax credit are recorded after either money 
is received or the goods/services were delivered. 
18 As of now, STA’s explicit approval is a necessary condition 
for the Treasury to issue a refund. This opens room for disc­
retion, and thus potentially also corruption within the STA. 
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on the issue is conducted, but no later than July 
1
st. 
4.2. VAT accounts and supporting measures 
The special VAT   bank account is an account with 
a bank   created and used only for the purpose of 
paying VAT to the budget, to suppliers, and of 
receiving VAT   from customers and from the bud­
get. At the moment, a seller   of   goods   receives 
payments to its current account; the funds   recei­
ved by   the seller   include the net price and the 
VAT amount; the VAT should then be transferred 
to the government. The introduction of   special 
accounts for VAT implies that payment for   goods 
will have to be split: the net price will go to the 
current account and VAT will go to the VAT ac­
count. 
There appear   to be both advantages and di­
sadvantages   of   the proposal. On the positive 
side, the introduction of special VAT accounts   in 
Ukraine if tied to the cash method and automatic 
refunding, will: 
•  	  increase VAT revenues due to a decrease of 
unlawful VAT rebates. Special VAT accounts 
will reduce the incentives to claim   illegitimate 
VAT rebates because it will become impos­
sible to cash in VAT rebates or   use them   as   a 
means of payment except for   paying VAT. 
Also, they   will reduce the number of fraudu­
lent VAT transactions.  As VAT money is se­
parated from   other monetary flows, more 
transparency will be introduced and fraud will 
be more easily detected. Also, the cash   me­
thod can prevent a buyer from claiming VAT 
refund without actually having paid for 
goods/services; 
•  	  speed up the process of   VAT   refunding. Cur­
rently, STA’s positive decision is   required for 
a refund from the Treasury. According to the 
proposal, the Treasury will automatically re­
fund provided no violations are found by the 
STA within 30 days; 
•  	  increase transparency and reduce the poten­
tial for corruption among STA officials   as   VAT 
refunds will no longer depend upon their   disc­
retionary approval. 
However,   exactly   because the introduction of 
special VAT accounts separates   VAT   money 
from other monetary flows, it will also: 
•  	  cause a decline in the cash flow of enterpri­
ses   as some funds will be locked into the 
VAT   accounts; the current system of VAT 
administration allows the enterprises the de 
facto use of   the VAT funds for some period of 
time. This might temporarily stifle business 
activity and stimulate demand for   bank   loans, 
pushing short-term   interest rates up, raising 
the cost of capital. The cost will mostly fall on 
relatively small businesses given the specific 
conditions of the Ukrainian economy:   for   lar­
ge business organizations, often associated 
with “friendly” banks, it will be relatively   easy 
to arrange for additional cheap loans; howe­
ver,   introducing the cash method along with 
special accounts   will alleviate the cash-flow 
problem. 
•  	  impose direct   costs both on taxpayers (ban­
king fees etc.) and on the government 
(implementing the system, teaching the staff, 
etc.) plus indirect cost to the budget (e.g., in 
the form of foregone taxes on profits that 
could have been generated by taxpayers   on 
the funds locked in the VAT accounts). 
Although VAT accounts tied to the cash method 
and automatic refunding do have the potential to 
deal with one-day-firms, they will not completely 
eliminate all VAT evasion schemes (see the list in 
section 2.2 above); examples include concentra­
tion of value added at the retail sales stage follo­
wed by concealment of some cash   earnings   (un­
derstated sales), and false exports   (inflated 
claims for VAT paid on inputs). 
Still, the transaction cost for engaging into 
VAT   evasion will be raised by the introduction 
of VAT accounts tied to the cash method and 
automatic refunding, thus   enhancing VAT 
compliance. 
Resulting higher tax compliance due to better   ad­
ministration might then justify the President’s pro­
posal to reduce the VAT rate. However, the tax 
rate cut itself will also reduce the attractiveness   of 
tax   evasion and thus stimulate proper tax compli­
ance. The rate reduction will also   compensate 
enterprises   for   a decline in the cash flow that will 
result from introduction of special VAT account. 
We   recommend not to implement the “joint 
responsibility”   and the “no refunds to new firms” 
proposals.   Joint responsibility will significantly raise 
the risk of doing business in Ukraine. No refunds   to 
new   firms   appears neither a fair proposal nor ef­









   
 
 




   
   
   






     
 
   
 





   
                                                     
   
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
   
     
VAT replacement or better administration? 
4.3. International experience 
The only country that has introduced VAT ac­
counts so far is Bulgaria.
19 VAT accounts were 
made mandatory there from the beginning of 
2003. Simultaneously, Bulgarian authorities took 
supporting measures to improve the administrati­
on of import duties and taxes  (including VAT on 
imports) that have led to more complete customs 
declarations. Also, the threshold level of sales 
above which registration as a VAT taxpayer is 
required was lowered and the number of taxpay­
ers was thereby increased by almost 7%.
20 
However, the data do not show a sharp inc­
rease in VAT revenues in Bulgaria in 2003. VAT 
revenues from imports increased by 16.4% for 
2003 against 2002, while imports grew in nominal 
terms by 13.2%.
21 VAT revenues from domestic 
operations nominally rose only by 0.52%.
22 Thus, 
the experience of Bulgaria shows that, even with 
an increase in the number of taxpayers, introdu­
cing VAT accounts does not necessarily lead to 
higher VAT revenues from domestic operations. 
However, initial conditions much different from 
Ukraine’s should be given credit: Bulgaria had a 
rather effective VAT taxation to begin with (Table 
4, Appendix). Also, the introduction of VAT ac­
counts were preceded by the “joint responsibility” 
rule in 1999-2002 so that VAT accounts were 
considered as a shift towards a softer, rather than 
a stricter fiscal regime.
23 
19 The Russian government planned to   introduce VAT   ac­
counts   by July   2004. However, it met with opposition arguing 
cash flow problems, higher costs and thus   higher inflation. 
The Russian government is now working on introducing 
"transit" accounts"   in 2006. VAT payments will pass through 
such accounts and then go to the main   accounts.   Cf.   VAT 
accounts in new form (in Russian).   Russian Tax Courier, No. 
8, 2004. 
20 Trunin, I., Special VAT accounts evidence in Bulgaria – 
main   conclusions   for Russia (in Russian), mimeo,   �oscow, 
IEPP, 2003. Available at 
http://www.iet.ru/personal/trounin/poitogam.pdf 
21 VAT on imports was 91.3% of total VAT   revenue in   Bulga­




22 End-of-year 2003 inflation in Bulgaria was 2.3%   and GDP 
grew by 4% in real terms. 
23  Trunin, I., Special VAT-accounts in Russia: analysis of 
possible consequences (in Russian), mimeo,   �oscow, IEPP, 
2003. Available at 
http://www.iet.ru/personal/trounin/spezscheta.pdf 
4.4. VAT administration and tax evasion 
As already indicated, tax evasion depends on 
three major factors: on the benefit from cheating, 
on the probability of being caught, and on the 
severity of punishment. 
Apart from the tax rate, benefits from cheating 
also depend on overall tax compliance and on 
whether the government performs its own refund 
obligations. Hence, both the recently increased 
government’s compliance with its refund obligati­
ons and the proposed tax rate reduction will 
contribute to a reduction of tax evasion. 
The probability of being caught depends on 
the quality of audit. Improper scheduling of in­
spections, lack of knowledge, insufficient techni­
cal capacity, insufficient information about the 
taxpayers and their business all diminish this 
quality. Also, the efficiency of the tax audit can be 
enhanced by redirecting more audit to the sphe­
res where the probability of tax fraud is highest. In 
this sense, it is conceivable that fraud prevention 
could include using the history of tax compliance 
for assessing tax liabilities,
24 e.g., by linking a 
well-defined tax compliance history to the appli­
cation of automatic refund. However, this must be 
done in a non-discriminatory way: we do not sup­
port the strict application of the “reliable taxpayer” 
concept proposed by Deputies S. Teriokhin et al. 
with the consequence of denying VAT cash re­
funds to new firms. 
Tax administration must strictly comply with 
the tax legislation passed by Verkhovna Rada,
25 
and STA orders must never contradict legal pro­
visions.
26 But low wages of tax administration 
staff, low probabilities of detection and small fines 
for tax fraud create incentives for corruption a­
gainst quality audit. The vicious circle of corrupti­
on and cheating results in tax base erosion. Ho­
wever, international experience shows that VAT 
revenues increase with the level of spending on 
tax administration.
27 This includes the possibility 
to increase the wages of the tax service employ­
ees combined with an automatic lay-off rule for 
corrupt staff. 
Cutting VAT privileges will also diminish cor­
ruption since privileges complicate the legislation 
24 T.M. Lee, Value-added taxation: mechanisms, design, and 
policy issues. Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing 
Countries, World Bank, Washington D.C., April 28 – May 1, 
2003. Cf. also GAG/IER, VAT refund crisis In Ukraine: cau­
ses, risks, and solutions, Policy Paper Q18, Kyiv, March 
2002. 
25 IMF Code on Fiscal Transparency. 
26 For example, the STA Order on the order of reimburse­
ment of the VAT and the VAT Law are contradictive, and the 
tax administration is mainly regulated by the Order of STA 
rather than by the provisions of the Law. 
27 Dobrinsky, R., Tax structures in transition economies in a 
comparative perspective with EU member states, in: Tumpel-
Gugerell, G., and P. Mooslechner (eds.), Structural Challen-




   
   
   
 
 
   
 
   
   
   
 
     
   
   
   
 
   














   
   
   






   
OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT MÜNCHEN 
and create more possibilities for discretion and 
thus corruption.
28 
28 Ibid. and Agha and Haughton (1996). 
4.5. VAT administration and VAT privileges 
While none of the draft laws in section 4.1 propo­
ses to further and sustainably cut VAT privileges, 
we argue that the problems of fraud and privile­
ges are closely related. A reduction of tax privile­
ges potentially pushes firms towards more fraud. 
On the other hand, if better administration (such 
as due to VAT accounts) makes fraud schemes 
become more expensive, firms are inclined to 
lobby for privileges or even misreport their types 
of activities to become eligible for privileges. 
VAT privileges are a form of implicit state aid. 
So far, there is no public information on and no 
well-defined rules of granting state aid to industry; 
the targets of state support and the choice of 
instruments are not based on cost-benefit analy­
sis. Consequently, the process of granting tax 
privileges is open to bargaining in the decision 
making body, i.e. the Verkhovna Rada. 
5. Recommendations 
Feasible options to overcome the low VAT reve­
nue problem include replacing VAT, e.g., with a 
general sales tax (GST), or improving VAT admi­
nistration. We argue that a VAT is superior to a 
GST in Ukraine. 
However, VAT administration can be signifi­
cantly improved. We recommend to introduce 
VAT accounts tied to the cash method and auto­
matic refunding of VAT, as both supporting mea­
sures will alleviate the cash-flow problem of spe­
cial accounts. We do not recommend "joint 
responsibility" as proposed in the President's 
draft, neither the strict application of the “reliable 
taxpayer” concept proposed by Deputies S. Teri­
okhin et al. with the consequence of denying cash 
VAT refunds to new firms. Accordingly, our stan­
ce is closest to the draft submitted by Deputies V. 
Khomutinnik and S. Buriak. 
Further, to effectively improve VAT complian­
ce and raise VAT revenues, it is necessary to do 
both – introduce VAT accounts tied to supporting 
measures and to further and sustainably cut VAT 
privileges (for example, those for agriculture pro­
ducts that according to the 6
th EU directive should 
be taxed at a flat rate). Also, we recommend to 
permanently cancel the privileges terminated by 
Verkhovna Rada when approving the 2004 bud­
get and to keep the moratorium on granting tax 
incentives for special economic zones. In additi­
on, exemptions granted for social purposes (inc­
luding: baby food, text books, goods of special 
purpose for handicapped, sale of recreation) 
should be replaced by targeted aid since the VAT 
is not a good instrument for achieving social 
goals. 
To sustainably diminish incentives for granting 
sector-specific and region-specific VAT privile­
ges, we recommend to introduce well-defined 
rules of granting state aid by re-drafting and en­
forcing the Law on State Aid.
29 In particular, we 
recommend to include an assessment of all diffe­
rent forms of direct and implicit subsidies, inclu­
ding tax expenditures, in the regular reports of the 
Anti-Monopoly Committee to Verhovna Rada.
30 
Resulting higher tax compliance due to better 
administration and a growing tax base due to 
diminished privileges might then justify reducing 
the VAT rate (as proposed in the President’s 
draft). 
29 This is in line with our general policy stance for rules ver­
sus discretion as summarized in GAG/IER, Institutional 
reforms versus selective targeting? Comments on the draft 
law “On state support of investment and encouraging invest­
ment activity” drafted by the Ministry of Economy, Policy 
Paper T30, Kyiv, April 2004. 
30 Cf. IER, Comment on the Draft Law “On State Aid”, Policy 
Paper A10, Kyiv, October 2003. 
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VAT replacement or better administration? 
Appendix: VAT performance in Ukraine in international context 
In order to quantify gaps between actual versus potential VAT revenues, different but related perfor­
mance indicators can be applied. All of these measures relate actual VAT revenues to statutory VAT 
rates and proxies of the VAT base, i.e. final consumption. 
•  	  Tables 2 and 3 present information on two commonly applied VAT   efficiency   measures: VAT   effi­
ciency   is   measured as the ratio of VAT revenues collected (net of cash refunds made) to GDP di­
vided by the standard (statutory) rate, i.e. 20% in Ukraine. VAT C-efficiency is   calculated as   the ra­
tio of collected VAT revenues (net of cash refunds) to total domestic consumption, again divided by 
31  the standard (statutory) rate.
32  While maximum efficiency and C-efficiency ratios are 60%  and 100%, respectively, the VAT effi­
ciency indicator for Ukraine in 2000 was only 27%. In particular,   this implies that everything else held 
constant as   in 2000, a 1% increase in the VAT rate would cause an increase of about 0.277 percenta­
ge points in the share of VAT revenues in GDP. By 2003 the VAT efficiency has even declined, to only 
24%. This is significantly lower than in EU and corresponds to indicator   levels   in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Table 3). Estimates   of   VAT   C-efficiency   in Ukraine in 2000 range from 37% to 45.4%. Again, this is 
significantly below EU average, Eastern Europe average, and transition economies average, and only 
slightly above CIS average. According to our   own calculations, VAT C-efficiency in Ukraine in 2003 
was 33%. 
•  	  Table 4 presents an international comparison of estimates of effective VAT rates, i.e. ratios of   VAT 
revenues to VAT base proxies, and relates these to statutory VAT rates. 
Notes on the international comparability   of national VAT performance indicators 
International comparisons of national VAT performance indicators are complicated due to various 
aspects. While standard exemptions are subtracted from consumption it is almost impossible to adjust 
for non-standard exemptions. It is hard to define the reduction of the VAT base due to presumptive 
taxation of small enterprises, very specific products that are not described in national accounts but, 
nevertheless, are exempt from taxation. Moreover, performance indicators based on national accounts 
data are not accurate due to first and last months tax base differences and inaccurate measurement of 
GDP. Comparison across countries that apply income-type versus consumption–type VAT is further 
complicated since only the latter system (applied in the majority of countries, including Ukraine) allows 
to credit the purchase of investment against VAT accrued. 
The variations of effective VAT rates (Table 4 in Appendix) also reflect different GDP compositions. 
The relatively low indicators for some high-income EU countries can be explained by a more develo­
ped services sector, which implies comparatively low taxable value added. On the other hand, VAT 
privileges tend to be less widespread and tax compliance is likely to be more efficient in EU count­
ries,
33 resulting in higher VAT revenues. 
31 Net of items that are exempt from the tax base according to international practice. 
32 Given Ukraine’s statutory VAT rate and share of consumption in GDP. 
33 Dobrinsky (2003). 
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Table 2: Summary of VAT performance statistics in Ukraine 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
VAT revenues, UAH bn  1.3  4.5  6.3  8.2  7.5  8.4  9.4  10.4  13.5  12.6 
VAT revenues, % of GDP  10.8  8.3  7.7  8.8  7.3  6.4  5.5  5.1  6.1  4.8 
VAT revenues, % of consolidated 
budget revenues  30.3  27.5  27.3  29.3  25.8  25.6  19.5  19.2  22.2  16.8 
VAT efficiency, %*  54.0  41.5  38.6  44.1  36.4  32.2  27.7  25.6  30.5  24.0 
VAT C-efficiency, %**  79.6  54.4  48.3  54.1  44.6  41.8  36.9  33.1  39.9  33.0 
VAT revenue execution, %  95.3  95.3  97.5  85.2  101.3  93.8  89.0  104.5 
Share of VAT revenues from domestic 
operations in total VAT revenue, %  68.0  62.3  49.6 
Share of VAT revenues from import 
operations in total VAT revenue, %  32.0  36.4  50.4 
Source: Legeida, N., and D. Sologoub, Modeling value-added tax (VAT) revenues in a transition economy: the case of Ukraine,
 
IER/GAG Working Paper, July, 2003.
 
Notes: * Ratio of VAT revenue to GDP, divided by standard tax rate.
 
** Ratio of VAT revenue to consumption, divided by standard tax rate.
 
GDP and consumption have been taken at consumer prices to calculate VAT efficiency and VAT C-efficiency ratios, respectively.
 
Table 3: VAT efficiency by region, % 
Sub-Saharan  Asia and  America  EU +Norway  Central  North Africa  Small islands 
Africa  Pacific  and Switzer- Europe and  and Middle 
land  BRO*  East 
E f f i c i e n c y  2 7  3 5  3 7  3 8  3 6  3 7  4 8 
C- e f f i c i e n c y  3 8  5 8  5 7  6 4  6 2  5 7  8 3 
Source:  IMF staff calculations, according to Ebrill, Keen, Bodin and Summers, 2002 quoted in Legeida and Sologoub (2003).
 
Notes: 
* Baltic states, Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union.
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Table 4: VAT rates and VAT compliance in the EU and in selected transition economies 
Statutory VAT rates, %  VAT as % of: 
Effective/statutory ratio 
vis-à-vis: 
Standard  Other  GDP 
Taxable gross 
value added 
(Effective VAT rate)  standard  adjusted 
A. EU member states, 1999 
Austria  20.0  10; 12  8.4  15.5  77.6  94.0 
Belgium  21.0  6.0; 12.0  7.2  17.2  82.1  93.1 
Denmark  25.0  9.7  24.3  97.3  97.3 
Finland  22.0  8.0; 17.0  8.7  20.4  92.7  97.1 
France  19.6  2.1; 5.5  8.0  18.6  94.7  97.7 
Germany  16.0  7.0  6.9  15.7  97.9  99.2 
Greece  18.0  4.0; 8.0  8.0  15.4  85.7  90.7 
Ireland  20.0  4.2; 12.5  6.5  17.0  85.0  97.2 
Italy  20.0  4.0;10.0  5.4  10.8  54.1  72.2 
Netherlands  19.0  6.0  7.0  16.6  87.2  97.5 
Portugal  17.0  5.0; 12.0  8.3  12.7  74.9  79.6 
Spain  16.0  4.0; 7.0  6.2  10.7  66.8  71.3 
Sweden  25.0  6.0; 12.0  7.1  17.9  71.4  96.6 
United Kingdom  17.5  5.0  6.7  14.3  81.9  95.6 
EU average  19.7  7.5  16.2  82.1  91.3 
B. Transition economies, 2000 
Albania  20.0  7.1  7.9  39.4  39.4 
Bulgaria  20.0  8.8  14.4  72.2  72.2 
Croatia  22.0  14.0  21.2  96.5  96.5 
Czech Republic  22.0  5.0  7.4  11.6  52.9  72.8 
Estonia  18.0  5.0  9.3  15.1  83.9  88.9 
Latvia  18.0  7.8  11.8  65.6  68.3 
Lithuania  18.0  5.0; 6.0; 9.0  7.6  11.3  62.6  66.3 
Hungary  25.0  12.0  10.7  19.8  79.2  82.5 
Poland  22.0  3.0; 7.0  7.6  11.3  51.4  56.5 
Romania  19.0  6.3  8.7  45.9  45.9 
Slovakia  23.0  7.8  12.1  52.5  52.5 
Slovenia  20.0  10.2  17.7  88.7  88.7 
Eastern Europe average  20.6  8.7  13.6  65.9  69.0 
Armenia  20.0  6.5  6.6  33.2  33.2 
Azerbaijan  18.0  4.1  5.4  29.8  29.8 
Georgia  20.0  10.0  9.5  13.8  68.8  72.4 
Belarus  20.0  4.8  5.8  28.8  28.8 
Kazakhstan  16.0  4.0  6.7  41.6  41.6 
Kyrgyzstan  20.0  4.6  5.5  27.4  27.4 
Republic of Moldova  20.0  8.0  8.3  8.8  44.2  46.5 
Russian Federation  20.0  10.0  6.7  13.6  68.2  71.7 
Tajikistan  20.0  2.5  3.5  17.6  17.6 
Ukraine  20.0  5.6  9.1  45.4  45.4 
CIS  average  19.4  5.7  7.9  40.5  41.4 
Transition economies average  20.0  7.3  11.0  54.4  56.5 
Source: Dobrinsky (2003).
 
Note: *The adjusted rate is calculated taking account of multiple tax structures. The effective/statutory ratio is calculated as a
 




** Taxable gross value added excludes standard privileges.
 